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COURT OF APPEALS, 1960 TERM
The religion of an engineer is not relevant to his professional qualifications,
but only becomes relevant as the result of the domestic policies of the place
of employment. There is no evidence that the Legislature of New York intended
the exemption to be used to allow discrimination on this basis.
It will be conceded that the Court might have been justified in finding
for Aramco, and that the result of this decision will place Aramco in a predicament. In the event that Aramco cannot produce a more compelling justification,
it is doubtful that SCAD on reinvestigation will allow the exemption. The
amount of harm resulting to Aramco will then depend entirely on the number
of applications for employment it receives from members of the Jewish faith.
Against this we can balance the social benefit derived from terminating a
policy of discrimination which is contrary to the letter and spirit of New York
law. New York is not a province of Saudi Arabia and owes no allegiances to
it. New York should not be forced to violate its principles of justice, or allow
its citizens to flaunt its laws, or to surrender any of its sovereignty merely
because a foreign power desires to enforce its own domestic policies which happen to be in conflict with those of New York.
J.D.R.
THE PUBLIC AUTHORITY AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

-The growth and expansion of government has created many administrative difficulties. The conventional form of governmental institution was not
suited to the handling of many of the vast enterprises carried on by governmental units. To facilitate administrative efficiency, we have developed the
public authority, an organization halfway between government and private business and endowed with the virtues of both. The dual personality of the public
authority or public corporation has posed some serious problems especially in
the area of sovereign immunity.
Benz v. New York State Thruway Authority' 5 illustrates the types of problems encountered in the area of sovereign immunity and the public corporation. The plaintiff brought a suit in equity against the Thruway Authority for
rescission or reformation of a contract for the sale of her land to the Authority.
The Thruway Authority appeared specially to contest the Supreme Court's
jurisdiction over person and subject matter. The gist of the Authority's argument was that, as an arm or agency of the State, it possessed sovereign immunity 6 and could not be sued in any court, unless it waived its immunity. The
State had only waived its immunity to be sued in the Court of Claims,' 7 which
does not have equity jurisdiction; therefore, the Supreme Court was without
jurisdiction. The Supreme Court dismissed the complaint and the Appellate
Division' 8 and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
15. 9 N.Y.2d 486, 215 N.Y.S.2d 47 (1961).
16. United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 207 (1882); Railroad Company v. Tennessee,
101 U.S. 337 (1879); Briggs v. Light Boats, 11 Allen (Mass.) 157 (1865).

17.

N.Y. Court of Claims Act § 8.

18.

11 A.D.2d 906, 205 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (4th Dep't 1960).
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The origins of sovereign immunity from suit were well explained in
Glassman v. Glassman:

The doctrine of sovereign immunity from suit, rooted in the ancient
common law, was originally based on the monarchical, semi-religious
tenet that 'the King can do no wrong'. In modern times, it is more
often explained as a rule of social policy, which protects the state
against burdensome interference with the performance of its governmental functions and preserves its control over state funds, property
and instrumentalities. (See United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 206.)19
The problem presented by the Benz case and others is not whether the
State is immune, but rather, is this public corporation clothed with the immunity
of the State. The test seems to be whether the particular activity in which the
governmental agency is engaged at the time of the injury is of a public or a
private nature. 20 The New York State Thruway Authority meets this test.
The construction and maintenance of highways, bridges and tunnels is one of
the primary governmental functions of the state.2 ' The case of Easley v. New
York State Thruway Authority relied on by all the courts in the instant case
squarely decided this issue. The Court said:
The Thruway Authority is a 'body corporate and politic, constituting
a public corporation', Public Authorities Law, Section 352, which performs part of the work of the State Government in building and maintaining a highway. It cannot be doubted that this authority is an
arm or agency of the State. The closeness of its relationship to the
State is illustrated by these situations among others: Its members are
appointed by the Governor with the approval of the Senate; its statutory purposes are declared to be governmental; its real property is held
in the name of the State; the State advanced the money for constructing the Thruway etc., and
22 eventually the Authorities' property will
revert to the State itself.
The immunity of a state agency is in no way affected by the fact that the
agency is endowed with the powers and privileges of a corporation. 3
Since the Thruway Authority is an arm or agency of the State, it can be
clothed with sovereign immunity. Indeed, it has generally been held that in the
absence of some express waiver of immunity, such bodies inherently partake
of their parent's sovereign immunity. 24 When sovereign immunity is waived,
the State may attach conditions and limitations to the right to bring an action.2
The only question then left for the Court to decide was the extent to which
19. 309 N.Y. 436, 440, 131 N.E.2d 721, 723 (1956).
20. Yonker v. City of San Gabriel, 23 Cal. App. 2d 556, 73 P.2d 623 (1937).
21. Voorhis v. Cornell Contracting Corp., 170 Misc. 908, 910, 10 N.Y.S.2d 378, 380
(City Ct. 1938), citing, Atkins v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207, 221, 222 (1903).
22. 1 N.Y.2d 374, 376, 153 N.Y.S.2d 28, 29 (1956).
23. Breen v. Mortgage Commission of State of N.Y., 285 N.Y. 425, 430, 35 N.E.2d
25, 27 (1941); In re Hicka, 180 Misc. 173, 40 N.Y.S.2d 267 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
24. In re Brown v. Trustees of Hamptonburg School Dist., 303 N.Y. 484, 104 N.E.2d
866 (1954).
25. Weber v. Lacey, 281 App. Div. 290, 120 N.Y.S.2d 88 (4th Dep't 1953).

COURT OF APPEALS, 1960 TERM

immunity from suit was waived by the Legislature. Section 361-B of the
Public Authorities Law confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the Court of Claims
to hear and determine all claims against the New York State Thruway for
alleged torts and breaches of contract. The State itself is amenable to suit only
in the Court of Claims. 26 The Court of Claims does not have power to hear
and decide equitable claims. 27 Thus, the plaintiff's cause of action being
equitable fails.
The dissent argued that, prior to the enactment of Section 361-B, the
Thruway was amenable to suit in the supreme court.28 The conferring of exclusive jurisdiction on the Court of Claims to hear and determine suits against
the Thruway for torts and breaches of contract did not prevent other types of
suits from still being brought in the supreme court. If the intention had been
to confer exclusive jurisdiction on the Court of Claims in all instances, it would
have been simple to have said so.
The answer to the dissenting position is best stated in the majority opinion
as follows:
It would indeed be remarkable if the legislature, which could have
forbidden suits to be maintained against the Authority in any court
or tribunal, produced a situation where suits at law could be prosecuted
(per express agreement) in the Court of Claims only but (by legislative silence) equity suits would be allowed against the Thruway Authority in the Supreme Court.
29 There is no sign that the lawmakers
had any such strange intent.
The independent corporate aspect of an authority was emphasized in New
York Post Corp. v. Moses,3 0 a proceeding under Section 1283 of the Civil Practice Act for an order directing the Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority to
permit petitioner to inspect its files and records. The Court of Appeals upheld
the Supreme Court's dismissal of the order and reversed the Appellate Division's granting of the order.
The plaintiff, aware of the lack of specific legislation, argues that he has a
right of inspection under the general provisions of law applicable to public
records of government. 31 Such a contention may be sustained here only if the
33
32
Authority is an agent of New York City or constitutes a "public office."
It is not valid as applied to officers or agents of the State. 34 The question then
is, whether the Authority is an arm or agency of the City.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Supra note 17.
Psaty v. Duryea, 306 N.Y. 413, 118 N.E.2d 584 (1954).
Strang v. State of New York, 206 Misc. 734, 134 N.Y.S.2d 871 (Ct. Cl. 1954).
Supra note 15 at 490, 215 N.Y.S.2d at 49.
10 N.Y.2d 199, 219 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1961).

31. N.Y. Public Officers Law § 66; N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 51.
32. N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 51.
33. N.Y. Public Officers Law § 66.

34. Bull v. Stichman, 298 N.Y. 516, 80 N.E.2d 661 (1948); Schieffelin v. Komfort,
212 N.Y. 520, 106 N.E. 675 (1914).
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The Court of Appeals held that there is not a sufficiently close connection
between the Authority and the City to deem it agent and principal. The Authority is a public benefit corporation, designed to function autonomously and free
from the controls and restraints which hamper the conventional type of State
board or department. On the authority of the Benz case, the Court declared
that constitutional and legislative policy dictates that public authorities should
be subjected only to those procedures which have been specifically mandated.
A like result was reached in Plumbing, etc. ContractorsAssociation v. New York
State Thruway Authority,3 5 in which case it was held that the Thruway was
free from the requirements of the State Finance Law, a statute general in nature. The Public Authorities Law, which is the only specific statute dealing
with these bodies, does not authorize the public to inspect the records of Triborough; therefore, the Legislature did not intend to grant the public such
a right.
Chief Judge Desmond, who wrote for the majority in Benz, emphatically
disagreed with the holding in the N. Y. Post case. He felt that, in applying
the test stated in Easley, which found the Thruway Authority to be an arm or
agency of the State, to the Triborough Authority, the Court should conclude
that the Authority was an arm or agency of the City or, at least, a board acting
on behalf of the City. Judge Fuld, in a separate dissenting opinion, points to
the Benz case as authority for the "public office" character of Triborough.
The Benz case points up the public character of an authority; whereas, the
N. Y. Post case emphasizes its private aspects. As a result of these decisions,
the public corporation is put in the unique position of having all the advantages
of government and none of the disadvantages of a private body. This presents
a fertile area for sovereign irresponsibility.
F. P.M.
RxiGHT To RECEIVE THE REPORT
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A tavern owner was charged with selling alcoholic beverages to a minor
under eighteen years of age.36 A hearing was subsequently held at which a
deputy commissioner presided as the hearing officer.8 7 At the close of the hearing, the attorney for the licensee requested a copy of the hearing officer's report,
prior to action thereon by the State Liquor Authority, in order that he might
have an opportunity to controvert the findings or conclusions in the report.
This request was refused, and the Authority thereafter revoked the licensee's
liquor permit. The licensee then instituted the present Article 78 proceeding, 8
35.

5 N.Y.2d 420, 185 N.Y.S.2d 534 (1959).

36. N.Y. Alcoholic Beverage Control Law § 65.
37. N.Y. Alcoholic Beverage Control Law § 119 (1, 2). (Providing the Liquor Authority with the authority to revoke licenses and providing a hearing before a hearing commissioner pursuant to final determination by the Authority.)
38. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 1284 provides the court with the power to review any act
or refusal to act of a body or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, administrative
or corporate functions, which involves an exercise of judgment or discretion.

